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Abstract
This paper examines the scal requirements for continuous full employ-
ment. We nd that (i) changes in the nancial behavior of households and
rms require adjustments in tax rates and public debt, (ii) the stability of
the steady-state solution for public debt depends on the scal instrument
and the household consumption function, (iii) in stable cases, a fall in gov-
ernment consumption (or a decline in another component of autonomous
demand) requires an increase in the steady-state ratio of public debt to
capital, and (iv) the steady-state tax rate may be positively or negatively
related to the level of debt.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the scal requirements of full employment growth. The
analysis is motivated by recent policy debates on public debt, and for present
purposes we accept some of the premises underlying this debate. Specically,
full employment is taken as a well-dened maximum level of non-inationary
employment, the growth rate of which is exogenously given. Given this (ques-
tionable) premise we disregard ination and assume the full employment path
has price stability.
Fiscal policy has received renewed attention since the nancial crisis; the
recent literature includes, among others, Arestis and Sawyer (2010), Davidson
(2010), Kregel (2010), and Nersisyan and Wray (2010). These studies view the
adjustment of government spending and taxes as a primary vehicle for main-
taining full employment, and the outstanding balance of public debt evolves as
a consequence of the chosen scal policy.1 Public debt, however, is not just
a consequence of peoples spending decisions and government scal policy; the
debt also inuences the spending decisions, and the dynamic interaction be-
tween e¤ective demand and public debt implies a particular trajectory of public
debt. This paper aims to clarify the mechanisms behind the interaction and the
properties of the trajectory of public debt.
Our analysis has a¢ nities with Skott (2001), Schlicht (2006), Nakatani and
Skott (2007) and Godley and Lavoie (2007), but in several respects our frame-
work is richer than these previous studies.2 Godley and Lavoie (2007) assume
away accumulation and nancial behavior in the rm sector. Their model, more-
over, excludes capital gains, and budget decits represent the only way in which
households can save and increase their wealth, as required in full employment
growth. Skott (2001), Schlicht (2006) and Nakatani and Skott (2007) include
accumulation. Financial aspects, however, are under-developed in these models,
and it is assumed that households own xed capital directly as one of the assets
in their portfolio. In this paper, by contrast, rms accumulate and make nan-
cial decisions, and households ownership of rms takes the form of nancial
assets, rather than a direct ownership of xed capital.
The key ndings are as follows. First, changes in the nancial behavior of
households and rms must be met by variations in tax rates and associated
movements in the level of the public debt in order to maintain full employment
growth. Such changes include shifts in household portfolios and changes in the
rates of retention or new equity issues by rms. Secondly, the stability of the
steady-growth solution for public debt depends on the specications of the s-
cal policy and the household consumption function. In some specications, the
steady-growth solution for public debt is unambiguously stable; other speci-
cations make stability conditional on parameter values and the details of the
1Abba Lerners theory of functional nance (Lerner, 1943) remains inuential in the con-
temporary post-Keynesian work on scal policy and public debt.
2The role of public debt in addressing demand problems in the presence of deation is
analyzed by Palley (2010). The analysis is short-run, however, and the level of nominal debt
is taken as given.
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policy regime. In the latter cases, a high tax rate on interest income exerts a
stabilizing inuence on the trajectory of public debt. These results explain the
di¤erences in the conclusions reached by Schlicht (who emphasizes the stabil-
ity of the debt dynamics) and Nakatani and Skott (who stress the possibility
of instability and the possible long-run limitations of scal policy). Thirdly, a
permanent fall in autonomous demand a cut in government consumption, for
instance, or a reduction in consumer condence  requires an increase in the
steady-growth ratio of public debt to capital when the debt dynamics is stable.
This implies, in particular, that there is an inverse relation between government
consumption and public debt. Fourthly, for a given level of government spend-
ing, the steady-growth tax rate may be positively or negatively related to the
level of debt, depending on whether the e¤ective cost of government borrowing
is higher or lower than the natural rate of growth.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out our model of a corpo-
rate economy. Sections 3 analyzes the scal requirements for full-employment
growth when the tax on distributed income is used as the policy instrument and
there is a uniform saving rate out of distributed income. Section 4 examines the
sensitivity of the results to changes in the saving and tax assumptions. Section
5 o¤ers a few concluding comments.
2 A model with nancial assets, portfolio choice
and corporate saving
Extending the approach in Skott (1988, 1989) and Skott and Ryoo (2008), we
consider four sets of agents (rms, households, government and banks) and three
nancial assets (bank deposits, government bonds and stocks).
Banks are passive: they accept deposits from households and give loans to
rms. The interest rates on deposits and loans are identical (rm), and banking
involves neither costs nor prots (neither households nor rms hold cash and
the amount of loans is equal to the amount of deposits). The interest rate is
taken as an exogenous policy variable and since there is no ination (cf. above)
nominal and real interest rates coincide.
The government nances current public consumption (G) and interest pay-
ments on the public debt through taxes and the issue of short bonds (B): Tax
revenue (T ) consists of corporate income tax, wage income tax and household
property income tax:
T = tf (Y   rmM) + tw(1  )Y + tp[Div + rmM + rbB] (1)
where tf ; tw and tp are the tax rates on corporate earnings, wage income and
property income;  is the prot share, Y output, rb the real interest rate on
bonds, and M the amount of deposits (=loans). Div is household dividend
income, which is given by
Div = (1  sf )(1  tf )(Y   rmM) (2)
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where sf is rmsretention rate out of prots net of interest and tax payments.
In section 3, we consider a benchmark case with a uniform proportional tax
rate t on household income (t = tw = tp); the analysis is generalized to include
other tax schemes in section 4.
The government budget constraint is given by
_B = rbB +G  T (3)
where a dot over a variable denotes a time derivative ( _B = dB=dt). Plugging
(1) into (3) and normalizing by the capital stock K, the budget equation can
be rewritten,
_b = b(B^   K^) = (rb   K^)b+ g   tf (u   rmm)  tw(1  )u
  tp[(1  sf )(1  tf )(u   rmm) + rmm+ rbb] (4)
where b = B=K, g = G=K, m = M=K and a hatover a variable denotes a
growth rate (B^ = _B=B); u is the utilization rate and  the maximum output
capital ratio in a xed-coe¢ cient production function (see equation (10) below).
Householdsportfolio contains bank deposits (=money, M), government
bonds (B) and stocks (N). The price of money and short bonds is one, and the
price of stocks is v: To simplify, we assume that bonds and money are perfect
substitutes; hence, they must yield the same return, rb = rm = r. Household
consumption is denoted as C.
The household budget constraint is given by
C + _M + _B + v _N = (1  tw)(1  )Y (5)
+ (1  tp)[(1  sf )(1  tf )(Y   rM) + r(B +M)]
and the portfolio shares are
vN
W
=  (6)
M +B
W
= 1   (7)
W =M+B+vN is household wealth. Dividing byK, the portfolio assumptions
imply
m+ b = (1  )W
K
(8)
The portfolio composition () may depend on the expected relative returns
on stocks and xed-interest assets. The return on stocks includes capital gains,
and a positive feedback from past gains to expected gains can be a source of
bubbles and instability.3 The resulting dynamics can be very complex and,
given the purposes of the present paper, we treat  as an exogenous variable
(noting in a couple of places how induced changes in  could a¤ect the con-
clusions). Perfect substitution between M and B means that the composition
3See e.g. Taylor and Rada (2003), Asada et al. (2010), Ryoo (2010) and Skott (2011).
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of householdsdemand for M and B is indeterminate as long as the two assets
have the same return.
The level of consumption, nally, is determined by a traditional consumption
function:
C
K
= cw(1  tw)(1  )u
+ cp(1  tp)[(1  sf )(1  tf )(u   rm) + r(m+ b)] + cvW
K
(9)
The parameters cw, cp and cv are the propensities to consume out of after-tax
wage income, after-tax property income, and wealth. Our benchmark model in
section 3 assumes that cw = cp; the general specication with di¤erential rates
is analyzed in section 4.
The production function has xed coe¢ cients and rms set prices as a
markup on labor cost. Formally,
Y = minfL; Kg (10)
 =

1 + 
(11)
where  denotes the markup; L is employment, and labor productivity is nor-
malized to one through the choice of units.
Firmsinvestment in xed capital (I) is nanced through retained earnings,
new issues of equity and bank loans:
I = sf (1  tf )(Y   rM) + _M + v _N (12)
New-equity decisions can be specied in terms of the growth of the number of
shares (N^) or the share of investment nanced by new issues ( ). The two
specications are related denitionally,
vNN^ =  I (13)
To simplify the analysis, we follow Eichner (1976) and Wood (1975) and take  
as constant.
By assumption, the production function has xed coe¢ cients and, disregard-
ing labor hoarding, a full-employment trajectory must satisfy the conditions
n = L^ = Y^ = u^+ K^ (14)
where n is the growth rate of the labor force. Utilization rates uctuate over
the business cycle but the uctuations take place around a fairly stable trend;
our focus, moreover, is on full-employment. We therefore assume a constant
utilization rate,
u = u (15)
Using (14)-(15), we have
K^ = n (16)
4
Equations (15)-(16) are consistent with simple versions of a Harrodian model
in which u is determined by structural factors and (long-run) accumulation is
perfectly elastic at u = u.4 Appendix A provides an extension of the model
which endogenizes u.
Using (13), (15) and (16) and dividing through by K in (12), rmsnance
constraint can be written
n = sf (1  tf )(u   rm) +mM^ +  n (17)
Using (17), the evolution of m is given by
_m = m(M^   n)
= (1   )n  sf (1  tf )u   [n  sf (1  tf )r]m (18)
and a steady growth path satises
m = m  n(1   )  sf (1  tf )u

n  sf (1  tf )r (19)
The parameter sf represents the ratio of net retained earnings (retained
earnings minus depreciation) to net prots, and empirically this ratio is low
(about .25 in the US). Thus, for plausible parameter values the coe¢ cient on
m in equation (18) will be negative ( [n  sf (1  tf )r] < 0) and the stationary
solution in (19) is stable. Most of the analysis in the rest of this paper assumes
that m has converged to the stationary value; the exceptions are Appendix A
(a generalized version of the model in section 3) and Appendix C (in which the
corporate tax rate tf is used as the scal instrument).
Using (15) and (16), nally, product market equilibrium requires
C
K
= u   n  g (20)
3 Benchmark dynamics
3.1 Analytical results
Consider a benchmark case with a uniform tax rate on all distributed income
and a uniform propensity to consume out of disposable income. Formally, let
tw = tp  t (21)
cw = cp  cu (22)
The tax rate on corporate earnings (tf ) and government consumption (g) are
taken as exogenous in the benchmark case; the government adjusts the tax rate
t on household income to achieve full-employment growth.
4The long-run sensitivity of investment to persistent changes in utilization rates is con-
tentious among post-Keynesians. Kaleckian models assume a very low sensitivity; Harrodian
models reject this restriction. Dutt 1997 and Hein at el. (2012) defend the Kaleckian position;
Skott and Zipperer (2010) and Skott (2012) advocate a Harrodian position.
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Putting together equations (8), (9), (15), (16) and (19)-(22) and solving for
t; we get
t = 1  u
   n  g   m+b1  cv
cu[(1  )u + (1  sf )(1  tf )(u   rm) + r(m + b)] (23)
Plugging (15), (16), (19), (21) and (23) into (4), straightforward algebra gives
the dynamics of b
_b = b(r   n) + g   tf (u   rm)
 t[(1  )u + (1  sf )(1  tf )(u   rm) + r(m + b)]
=

1  cu
cu

(u   n  g)   n 

n+
cv
cu(1  )

(b+m) (24)
where the last equality uses rmsbudget constraint sf (1  tf )(u  rm) =
(1    m)n.
Equation (24) implies an important result. There is a negative feedback
from the level of debt and the debt dynamics is unambiguously stable:
d_b
db
=  n  cv
cu(1  ) < 0 (25)
The expression for the stationary value of b can be found from (24).
b =

1 cu
cu

(u   n  g)   n
n+ cvcu(1 )
 m (26)
where m is given by (19).5
The consumption-wealth ratio also converges to a stationary value:
cW =
C
W
=
C=K
W=K
=
(1  )(u   n  g)
m + b
=
[(1  )ncu + cv](u   n  g)
(1  cu)(u   n  g)  cun (27)
Equation (27) can be derived from (8), (20) and (26). The stationary ratio, cW ,
is attained through the adjustment of consumption and wealth; the stability of
the debt dynamics in (24) ensures the convergence of this process. The steady-
growth tax rate, nally, can be found by using, (23), (26) and (27). The tax
rate is below one for all plausible parameter values.6
5 In order to ensure that household total wealth is positive, we need
1  cu
cu

(u   n  g)   n > 0
Empirically, this condition is met. The expression u   n   g represents the consumption-
capital ratio and  is small; in fact, the rate of new issues has been negative in the US since
the 1980s.
6The steady-growth tax rate can be written
t = 1  (c

W   cv)(m + b)=(1  )
cu

(1  )u + (1  sf )(1  tf )(u   rm) + r(m + b)

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3.2 Discussion
The absence of the real interest rate in the stability condition (25) may seem
surprising. It is often argued that the debt dynamics will be stable if n > r and
unstable if n < r.7 The n > r condition is derived, however, on the assumption
that changes in public debt have no e¤ects on the primary budget balance;
in general, this premise will be violated if policy is adjusted to maintain full
employment.
An increase in government debt raises household wealth and stimulates con-
sumption. The level of consumption normalized by the capital stock, C=K,
must be constant, however, in order to maintain full employment (cf. equation
(20)). The stimulus therefore has to be o¤set by a rise in taxes. Formally, using
(8), (9), (20) and (22) we have
C
K
= cu

Yh
K
  Th
K

+ cv

m + b
1  

= u   n  g (28)
where Yh=K  (1 )u+(1 sf )(1 tf )(u rm)+r(m+b) is household
before-tax income and Th is the tax on household income. The second term
in the second expression on the right-hand-side of (28) is increasing in b (the
wealth e¤ect), and a rise in debt therefore must reduce household disposable
income, YhK   ThK . But this is just another way of saying that as b increases,
taxes must increase by more than the rise in interest payments. Thus, there
can be no stability problem. Note, however, that the argument depends on a
uniform consumption rate out of disposable income; section 4 examines the debt
dynamics in a more general setting.
Our second observation follows directly from equation (26): there is an in-
verse relation between the required debt and government spending.8 This result
may seem paradoxical but the intuition is simple. A high value of g implies that
private consumption must fall as a share of output; this fall is induced by a
reduction in public debt (which reduces household interest income and wealth).
Note that m is determined via rmsnance constraint and is not a¤ected by
g.
Thirdly, the adjustment of total wealth W to changes in B +M involves
endogenous variations in stock prices. Since WK =
m+b
1  , an increase in b raises
household wealth for a given m and . Households will increase their desired
stock holdings (vNK ) in proportion to the increase in total wealth, and stock
prices (v) change to produce the required adjustment. The adjustment mech-
anism is also reected in the response of Tobinq (q) to variations in b: By
The denominator of the second term in the right-hand side is positive, and the numerator will
be positive if cW > cv . Using (27), we have:
cW   cv =
cu[f(1  )n+ cvg(u   n  g) + cvn ]
(1  cu)(u   n  g)  cun 
This expression is positive for all plausible values of  . The same condition ensures that cW
is increasing in cu.
7E.g. see Arestis and Saywer (2010), Cecchetti et al. (2010) and Galbraith (2011).
8Schlicht (2006) obtains a similar result.
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denition q = M+vNK = m+
(m+b)
1  , and a rise in b must raise q if  and m are
given.
Fourthly, it is straightforward to derive the e¤ects of some of the behavioral
changes that have been associated with nancialization and neoliberalism. A
reduction in the retention rate (a fall in sf ) increases rmsindebtedness (m)
by reducing retained earnings, and the rise in m will require a reduction in b:9
Analogously, an increase in stock buybacks (a fall in  ) reduces equity nance
and raises rmsindebtedness m. Thus b will fall.10 11 Distributional changes
also a¤ect debt: an increase in the prot share reduces m and raises b:
Fifthly, household behavior inuences the scal requirements. Reduced con-
dence (an increase in pessimism) may be reected in a decline in the consump-
tion propensities and/or a ight from equity to safe assets (a fall in ). Both
of these changes require an increase in b. Intuitively, a reduction in  decreases
household wealth for given b and m. This puts downward pressure on consump-
tion (via the wealth e¤ect) and the government must allow its debt to increase
to maintain the required level of consumption; the increased public debt raises
interest income and wealth and makes up for the fall in :
For a given b, sixthly, an increase in the interest rate r increases household
interest income and wealth, thereby stimulating consumption.12 (The increase
in wealth is due to an induced increase in rm indebtedness m) Thus, a reduc-
tion in the steady-growth level of public debt is required to keep consumption
at the level required by full-employment steady growth. The e¤ect of changes in
r for given  could be o¤set if the increase in r shifts household portfolios away
from stocks (a fall in ). The negative e¤ect of changes in r on b dominates
the induced e¤ect if the changes in household portfolios are relatively moderate;
large changes in the portfolio composition reverse the e¤ect.
Dynamic adjustments of the tax rate, nally, guide the public debt ratio to
its new steady state following an exogenous shock, and the short- and long-run
e¤ects on taxes can be di¤erent, even qualitatively. Consider an increase in
household condence and a portfolio shift towards stocks, that is, an increase
in . Using equation (23) it follows that in the short run this shift should be
met by a rise in taxation: an increase in  raises wealth (for given m; b) as the
attempts by households to buy up stock leads to an increase in stock prices and
capital gains. The increase in wealth stimulates consumption, and disposable
income must be reduced in order to keep consumption at the required level. But
9Retained earnings will fall as sf decreases as long as u   rm > 0; a reversal of this
inequality would undermine the long-run viability of a capitalist system.
10The reduction in  raises both m and m+ b. The increase in m+ b, however, is smaller
than the increase in m.
11Recent attempts by rms to reduce leverage (reduce m) conversely have raised the de-
mand for b: An increase in the perceived riskiness of rm debt would work in the same
direction. The absence of corporate bonds and the simplifying assumption of perfect substi-
tutability between deposits and government bonds, however, makes the model ill-suited to
analyze this aspect.
12We have taken the real interest rateas an exogenous policy variable. This is clearly an
oversimplication. A distinction should be made between the federal funds rate and other
rates, but central banks do have the ability to inuence long rates; the experiments with
quantitative and qualitative easing represent steps in this direction.
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the rise in taxation has dynamic e¤ects. The impact e¤ect of an increase in 
will be counteracted by the ensuing decline in government debt and household
wealth (where again changes in stock prices play a role, but now producing
capital losses). As a result, the steady-growth e¤ects on taxes can go either way
depending on the sign of (1  t)r   n.13
To summarize, the details may be messy but changes in private-sector be-
havior or monetary policy have implications for scal policy. Adjustments in
taxes and public debt make it possible to maintain full employment growth, and
the debt dynamics is stable in the benchmark model.
4 Robustness and qualications
The benchmark model assumed a uniform household propensity to consume out
of wage and property income, and the scal instrument was a uniform tax rate
on household income. We now relax these assumptions.
Using the general specication in equations (1) and (9), without the restric-
tions (21) and (22), the equilibrium condition (20) for the product market can
be written
cw(1  tw)(1  )u + cp(1  tp)[(1  sf )(1  tf )(u   rm) + rm+ rb]
+
cv(m+ b)
1   + n+ g = u
 (29)
This condition for full-employment growth can be satised by adjusting the tax
rates on wage income (tw); property income (tp), or corporate income (tf ); or
by changing the level of government consumption (g).
4.1 Unstable scenarios
Consider a scal regime in which the tax on wage income is adjusted to main-
tain full employment. Solving (29) for tw and using (19), we can rewrite the
13Consider the government budget constraint in the steady state.
b(r n)+ g  t[(1 )u+(1  sf )(1  tf )(u  rm)+ r(m+ b)]  tf (u  rm) = 0
Taking total derivatives, we have
(r   n)db  trdb  [(1  )u + (1  sf )(1  tf )(u   rm) + r(m + b)]dt = 0
or
dt
db
=
(1  t)r   n
(1  )u + (1  sf )(1  tf )(u   rm) + r(m + b)
The denominator is unambiguously positive and the sign of the derivative depends on (1 t)r 
n: The steady-state tax rate is positively (negatively) related to the debt ratio if (1 t)r n > 0
(if (1   t)r   n < 0). Since an increase in  reduces b, t is negatively related to  if
(1  t)r   n > 0, and positively related to  if (1  t)r   n < 0.
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government budget equation:
_b =

1  cw
cw

(u   n  g) +

cw   cp
cw

(1  tp)(1  sf )(1  tf )(u   rm)
  n 

n+
cv
cw(1  )  

cw   cp
cw

(1  tp)r

(m + b) (30)
The debt dynamics is stable if
d_b
db
=  

n 

cw   cp
cw

(1  tp)r + cv
cw(1  )

< 0 (31)
This condition need not be satised. Consider a simple case without saving
from wage income (cw = 1), no wealth e¤ect (cv = 0) and no property income
tax (tp = 0). Substituting these assumptions in (31), the stability requirement
simplies to
n  (1  cp)r > 0 (32)
A combination of high saving rates out of property income and a low natural
rate of growth reverses the inequality, leading to an unstable trajectory of public
debt. This unstable case was examined by Skott (2001) and Nakatani and Skott
(2007).
More generally, the condition (31) is met and the debt dynamics will be
stable if the household propensity to consume out of property income is greater
than or equal to that of wage income (cp  cw). But the system may lose
stability if cw is large compared to cp, the property income tax rate tp is low,
the real interest rate r is high, the wealth e¤ect cv is low and the natural rate
of growth is low. Low values of cp and cv imply that the e¤ect of an increase in
government debt on consumption demand will be weak, requiring only a small
reduction in consumption demand out of wage income in order to keep C=K
constant. If the propensity to consume out of wage income is large, the required
reduction in consumption demand can be achieved by a small increase in the
tax rate on wage income. Consequently, the increase in tax revenue may be too
small to compensate for the increase in interest on government bonds; the debt
rises, and in the unstable case it grows faster than the natural rate.
The comparative statics has limited interest in the unstable case but assum-
ing stability, the steady-growth solution for the debt ratio follows from (30):
b =

1 cw
cw

(u   n  g) +

cw cp
cw

(1  tp)DivK    n
n+ cvcw(1 )  

cw cp
cw

(1  tp)r
 m (33)
where DivK  (1  sf )(1  tf )(u  rm). Stability implies that b is inversely
related to cp, cv and . In general, however, the e¤ects on b of changes in
parameters become more complicated than in the previous section.
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4.2 A general stability result
The change in the debt ratio can be written
_b = (r   n)b+ g   T
K
(34)
Equation (34) implies a su¢ cient condition for stability: assuming n > 0; sta-
bility is ensured if
d TK
db
 r (35)
The consumption-capital ratio must be constant in steady growth equation
(20) and this has implications for the e¤ects of changes in debt on tax revenue.
Let total consumption depend on k+1 di¤erent categories of disposable income,
each with a distinct marginal propensity to consume, as well as on total wealth.
We take interest income from government bonds as income category k + 1.
Formally,
C
K
= 

Y1   T1
K
; :::;
Yk   Tk
K
;
rB   TB
K
;
W
K

(36)
where Yi and Ti denote income category i and the taxes levied on this income;
Ti = tiYi for i = 1; :::; k; Yk+1 = YB = rB; Tk+1 = TB = tBrB. Assuming
that the full-employment incomes Y1=K; :::; Yk=K are independent of the public
debt ratio b, the constancy of C=K implies that
kX
i=1
 i
dTiK
db
+ B
 
r   d
TB
K
db
!
+ v
dWK
db
= 0 (37)
where i is the marginal propensity to consume out of income i; v is the
marginal consumption out of wealth. The changes in tax revenue are given by
dTiK
db
=
Yi
K
dti
db
; i = 1; :::; k (38)
dTBK
db
= rtB + rb
dtB
db
(39)
The government adjusts one or more tax rates to maintain full-employment
growth. Let us denote as S the set of income categories with adjustments in tax
rates; by denition S is a subset of the index set f1; 2; :::; k; Bg. Now consider
two cases. In the rst case, S contains interest income on bonds (B 2 S and
dTiK =db = 0 for i =2 S); in the second case, the tax rate on bond income is kept
constant (B =2 S; dtBdb = dTiK =db = 0 for i =2 S and i 6= B). In both cases we
assume that dti = dtj for all i; j in S:14
14A generalization to cases with dti 6= dtj is conceptually straightforward but expositionally
messy.
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Case 1. Variable tax rate on bond interest
In this case dti = dtB for all i 2 S, and equation (37) implies that
d(T=K)
db
= r +
v
B(1  )
+

B   
B
 X
i2SnfBg
d(Ti=K)
db
(40)
where  is the weighted average propensity to consume out of income categories
in SnfBg, i.e.  = Pi2SnfBg i YiK =Pi2SnfBg YiK . See Appendix B for the
derivation of (40).
If B  , the last term in (40) will be non-negative. Thus the increase
in tax revenue in response to a marginal increase in b will be greater than r.
Our benchmark case in section 3 provides an example of this stable case: the
variable tax rate applied to all income categories and the propensity to consume
was uniform (B =  = cu). The adjustment of the property income tax rate
(tp) under the consumption specication (29) is another example: in this case
dividend, interest on deposits and interest on bonds are taxed at the variable
tax and subject to the same consumption propensity (B =  = cp). In both
examples, the general su¢ cient condition for stability (35) is satised. If B < ,
on the other hand, the increase in tax revenue may fall short of r. Thus the
debt dynamics may be unstable.
Case 2. Fixed tax rate on bond interest
In this case, we have see Appendix B 
d(T=K)
db
= r +
v
~(1  ) +
 
B   ~
~
!
(1  tB)r (41)
where ~ is the weighted average propensity to consume out of income categories
in S, i.e. ~ =
P
i2S i
Yi
K =
P
i2S
Yi
K .
Thus, if B  ~, the amount of tax revenue generated by a marginal increase
in b will be su¢ cient to cover r; if B < ~, on the other hand, the increase in
tax revenue may be less than r. The potential instability can be tamed by a
high tax rate on bond interest income: if the tax rate on interest income tB
is su¢ ciently high, (41) must be satised. The intuition is simple: if a large
fraction of interest payment to bondholders returns to the government as tax
revenue, the e¤ective cost of government borrowing will decrease. Variable tax
rates on wage income in section 3.1 exemplies this general result.
Putting together these results, stability is ensured if (i) the propensity to
consume out of interest on government bonds is greater than or equal to the
propensity to consume out of the income that is subject to variable tax rates,
or (ii) interest on bonds is taxed at a su¢ ciently high rate.
These conclusions which generalize those in sections 3 and 4.1 are derived
for exogenous income-capital ratios: we assumed that the pre-tax distributed
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incomes Y1=K; :::; Yk=K are independent of changes in debt and the associated
scal response. The assumption is not as restrictive as it may seem, given our
focus on growth paths with continuous full-employment. The pre-tax wage-
capital ratio, for instance, is determined by the markup and the utilization rate,
both of which are constant along the paths that we consider; a disaggregation
of the labor force and total wage income into di¤erent subcategories based on
skill, sector, race, gender or other criteria could also t the assumption.
Some scal policies violate the exogeneity assumption for the pre-tax in-
comes Yi; i = 1; :::; k. An example is the use of adjustments in corporate taxes
to maintain full employment. Corporate taxes inuence retained earnings and
distributed incomes; in addition there are indirect e¤ects on the corporate debt
ratio m. Changes in the corporate tax therefore have repercussions for house-
holdspre-tax incomes. These e¤ects complicate the analysis but as shown in
Appendix C, the qualitative conclusions are similar to those in section 3.
4.3 Variable government consumption
So far we have taken government consumption as exogenous. Now consider the
case in which g adjusts to maintain full-employment growth, keeping constant
all tax rates. The required level of government consumption can be found by
solving (29) for g. We have:
g = u   n  cw[(1  tw)(1  )u] (42)
 cp(1  tp)[(1  sf )(1  tf )(u   rm) + rm + rb]  cv(m
 + b)
1  
The higher is b, the lower is the required government consumption:
dg
db
=  

cp(1  tp)r + cv
1  

< 0 (43)
This inverse relationship between g and b is conducive to the stability of the
trajectory of public debt, but stability is not unconditional. To see this, substi-
tute (42) into the government budget equation and di¤erentiate with respect to
b:
d_b
db
= r   n+ dg

db
  tpr =  

n  (1  cp)(1  tp)r + cv
1  

(44)
The stationary point is stable if
n  (1  cp)(1  tp)r + cv
(1  ) > 0 (45)
An increase in public debt raises household consumption and thereby reduces
the required government consumption, but the reduction need not o¤set the
increase in interest payments. High values of cp, cv or  are stabilizing; they
imply a large consumption e¤ect from any given increase in b and therefore allow
a big reduction in government consumption without violating the condition for
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full employment. The stability criterion (45) also conrms the important role
of tax policy in stabilizing the trajectory of the debt ratio: a su¢ ciently high
tax rate on interest income (tp) ensures stability.15
5 Conclusion
The current obsession with public debt is paradoxical from the perspective of
mainstream Ramsey models, in which the nancing of any given stream of pub-
lic spending is largely irrelevant. OLG models point to possible long-run e¤ects
of public debt on interest rates and the capital stock, but even the saving as-
sumptions that are at the center of these models are questionable: only the
young save, leading to an empirically implausible implication that saving rates
will be higher out of wage income than out of capital income.16 The framework
in this paper therefore is very di¤erent.
The general lessons from our stock-ow consistent model of a corporate
economy are quite simple. Fiscal decits and a rise in public debt are necessary
if the government wants to maintain full employment following a decline in
demand. This Keynesian insight remains as valid as ever. Looking beyond
the short run, one could ask whether current debt levels and scal decits are
sustainable. It is not always clear what is meant by sustainability, but the
question may be whether the scal requirements for full employment growth will
generate an ever-increasing debt-GDP ratio. In the models we have considered,
the stability of the trajectory of public debt depends on the specications of
scal policies and household behavior, and the case of instability cannot be
ruled out. The current obsession with debt and austerity is misguided, however.
Fluctuations in private sector condence and nancial behavior can and should
be o¤set by variations in public debt. The remedy against instability is not
scal austerity. Stability can be ensured if the tax on interest income is used as
the active scal instrument; alternatively, a constant tax rate on interest income
guarantees stability as long as the rate is su¢ ciently high.
The analysis in this paper has many limitations. Most prominently, perhaps,
we have assumed a closed economy. Open (and local) economies are in a very
di¤erent position than sovereign countries that control their own currency; this
paper says nothing about the open-economy issues.
Even in a closed-economy context we have focused on a subset of issues,
and a large public debt can have negative e¤ects that we have not considered.
The size of the public debt inuences the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy. A
contractionary monetary policy raises interest rates and generates an automatic
scal expansion unless it is matched by an increase in tax rates. Thus, monetary
policy is blunted and this may complicate short-run economic policy.
Secondly, there may be concerns over distribution. The burden of high
debt and high interest does not fall on future generations; by construction the
15The condition (45) lies behind the stable debt dynamics in Schlicht (2006, section 4) and
Godley and Lavoie (2007).
16Skott and Ryoo (2011) analyze public debt in a modied OLG setting.
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levels of real resources that are passed on to future generations in the form
of xed capital is kept at the full employment path. But the debt may have
regressive distributional e¤ects if taxes on wage income are used to nance
interest payments to the rich. These distributional e¤ects indirectly played a
role in our analysis: the combination of distributional changes and di¤erential
saving rates lies behind the potential instability of the debt dynamics. Thirdly,
negative incentive e¤ects of taxes may come into play. These incentive e¤ects
are, we believe, greatly exaggerated in most economic analysis. Still, incentive
issues need to be addressed.
The scal requirements of full employment growth, nally, have been derived
for given values of a number of variables, including r and . One may ask
whether other policy instruments can be brought to bear on these variables and
thereby reduce the required debt levels. If industrial and distributional policies,
for example, are used to lower the prot share, then this leads to a reduction
in the required level of public debt in our model of a corporate economy. A
discussion of these alternative (or complementary) policies is beyond the scope
of the present paper.
References
[1] Arestis, P. and Sawyer, M. (2010) The return of scal policy". Journal of
Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 327-346.
[2] Asada, T., Chiarella, C., Flaschel, P., Mouakil, T., Proano, C. and Semm-
ler, W. (2010) Stabilizing an Unstable Economy: On the Choice of
Proper Policy Measures". Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment
E-Journal, No. 2010-21.
[3] Cecchetti, S. G., Mohanty, M. S., and Zampolli, F. (2010) The future of
public debt: prospects and implications". BIS Working Papers. No. 300.
[4] Davidson, P. (2010) Making dollars and sense of the U.S. government
debt". Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 661-665.
[5] Dutt, P. (1997) Equilibrium, path dependence and hysteresis in post-
Keynesian models". In P. Arestis, G. Palma and M. Sawyer (eds) Capi-
tal Controversy, Post- Keynesian Economics and the History of Economic
Thought: Essays in Honour of Geo¤ Harcourt, London: Routledge.
[6] Eichner, A. (1976) The Megacorp and Oligopoly, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press
[7] Galbraith, J. K. (2011) Is the federal debt unsustainable?" Policy Note,
2011/2, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.
[8] Godley, W. and Lavoie, M. (2007) Fiscal policy in a stock-ow consistent
(SFC) model." Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, vol. 30, n. 1, pp.
79-100
15
[9] Hein, E., Lavoie, M. and van Treeck, T. (2012) Harrodian Instability and
the Normal Rateof Capacity Utilization in Kaleckian Models of Distrib-
ution and Growth A Survey." Metroeconomica, forthcoming.
[10] Kregel, J.(2010) Fiscal Responsibility: What Exactly Does It Mean." Levy
Economics Institute Working Papers, No.602
[11] Lerner, A. P.(1943) Functional nance and the federal debt."Social Re-
search, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 38-57.
[12] Nakatani, T. and Skott, P. (2007) Japanese growth and stagnation: A
Keynesian perspective." Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Vol.
18 (3), pp. 306-332.
[13] Nersisyan, Y. and Wray, L. R. (2010) Decit Hysteria Redux? Why
We Should Stop Worrying about U.S. Government Decits." Public Policy
Brief, no. 111, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.
[14] Palley, T. (2010) The Simple Macroeconomics of Fiscal Austerity, Public
Sector Debt and Deation." IMK Working Paper, no.8/2010. Dusseldorf.
[15] Schlicht, E. (2006) Public Debt as Private Wealth: Some Equilibrium
Considerations." Metroeconomica, 57 (4), pp. 494-520.
[16] Ryoo, S. (2010) Long waves and short cycles in a model of endogenous
nancial fragility." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 74(3).
pp. 163-186.
[17] Skott, P. (1988) Finance, Accumulation and the Choice of Technique."
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 12, pp. 339-354.
[18] Skott, P. (1989) Conict and e¤ective demand in economic growth. Cam-
bridge University Press.
[19] Skott, P. (2001) Demand Policy in the Long Run." In P. Arestis, M. Desai
and S. Dow (eds), Money Macroeconomics and Keynes, Routledge, pp.
124-139.
[20] Skott, P. (2011) Increasing inequality and nancial instability." Working
Paper 2011-20, University of Massachusetts Amherst.
[21] Skott, P. (2012) Theoretical and Empirical Shortcomings of the Kaleckian
Investment Function." Metroeconomica. forthcoming.
[22] Skott, P. and Ryoo, S. (2008) Macroeconomic Implications of Financiali-
sation." Cambridge Journal of Economics, 32 (6), pp.827-862.
[23] Skott, P. and Ryoo, S. (2011) Public debt in an OLG model with im-
perfect competition." Working Paper 2011-25, University of Massachusetts
Amherst.
16
[24] Skott, P. and Zipperer, B. (2010) An Empirical Evaluation of Three Post
Keynesian Models." Working Paper 2010-08, University of Massachusetts
Amherst.
[25] Taylor, L. and Rada, C. (2003) Debt-equity cycles in the 20th Century:
empirical evidence and a dynamic Keynesian model." New York, NY: Cen-
ter for Economic Policy Analysis, New School University.
[26] Wood, A. (1975) A Theory of Prot, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press
Appendix A: Endogenous variations in u and m
The model in the main text took the portfolio composition  as an exogenous
variable and employed a simple Harrodian specication of the investment func-
tion. This appendix considers an extension in which the desired utilization rate
depends on Tobins q (as in Skott 1989) while the desired portfolio composition
is determined by the relative rates of return. Formally,
u = f(q; x); fq < 0; fx < 0 (46)
 = (; z);  > 0; z > 0 (47)
where  and q are the prot rate and Tobins q; x and z denote the autonomous
element of rms animal spirits and household condence (an increase in x
shifts the investment function upwards and an increase in z shifts the desired
portfolio towards stocks for given relative returns). The denition of Tobins q
and the rate of prots  are unchanged. Thus,
q =
(m+ b)
1   +m (48)
 = u (49)
Plugging (47)-(50) in (46), we have:
u = f

(u; z)(m+ b)
1  (u; z) +m;x

(50)
In section 3, we assumed that rmsaccumulation was kept constant at n
and that the debt-capital ratio m had converged to its stationary value. Let us
allow the accumulation rate to vary according to a simple investment function:
I
K
= (u  u); 0 > 0; (0) = n (51)
After substituting (50) in (51), we can express I=K as a function of u, m, b, z
and x.
I
K
= (u;m; b; x; z); u > 0; m > 0; b > 0 ; x > 0; z > 0 (52)
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Since government scal policies maintain the growth rate of output at the nat-
ural rate, we have
_u = (Y^   K^)u = [n  (u;m; b; x; z)]u (53)
Firms budget constraint implies
_m = (u;m; b; x; z)(1    m)  sf (1  tf )(u   rm) (54)
Product market equilibrium and the government budget equation yield:
_b = g   tf (u   rm)  [(1  )u + (1  sf )(1  tf )(u   rm) + rm]
+
u   (u;m; b; x; z)  g
cu
  cv
cu[1  (u; z)]m
 

(u;m; b; x; z) +
cv
cu(1  (u; z))

b (55)
From (53)-(55), the steady-growth solution for b is given by
b =

1 cu
cu

(u   n  g)   n
n+ cvcu(1 )
 m (56)
where m and u are given by (19) and (50), respectively. Substituting (56)
back into (50), we have:
u = f

(u; z)[(1  cu)(u   n  g)  cu n]
[1  (u; z)]cun+ cv +m
; x

(57)
If fq is small, the implicit function theorem ensures the existence of a function
that maps parameter values into the utilization rate u.
u = (x; z; g; cu; cv; sf ;  ) (58)
Substituting (58) in (49) and then in (47), we obtain the portfolio share as a
function of parameters.17
 = ((x; z; g; cu; cv; sf ;  ); z) (59)
By plugging (58) and (59) back into (56), we can eliminate u and  and
express the steady-growth solution for the public debt ratio as a function of the
parameters.
The comparative statics is complicated but it can be shown that if fq is
su¢ ciently small, the e¤ect of g, cv, and cu on b remains negative and the e¤ect
of sf and  is positive, as in the case of constant  and u. It can also be shown
that the e¤ect of z on b will be negative; the e¤ect of x on b; on the other hand,
is ambiguous.
17The existence of an economically meaningful solution for u in (0; 1] and for  in (0,1)
requires restrictions on the related functions.
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For the analysis of stability, let us denote as J the Jacobian matrix of the
system (53)-(55) evaluated at the stationary point and as Ji a submatrix of J
obtained by deleting the ith row and column of J . A su¢ ciently small value
of fq ensures the local stability of the steady-growth path (if it exists). To see
this, note that as fq ! 0, we have:
Tr(J) !  

uu
 + n  sf (1  tf )r + n+ cv
cu(1  )

< 0
3X
i=1
Det(Ji) ! cv
cu(1  ) [uu
 + n  sf (1  tf )r]
+[n  sf (1  tf )r](uu + n) + uun > 0
Det(J) !  uu[n  sf (1  tf )r]

n+
cv
cu(1  )

< 0
and
 Tr(J)
3X
i=1
Det(Ji) +Det(J)!

(n  sf (1  tf )r) + n+ cv
cu(1  )

[n  sf (1  tf )r + uu]

uu
 + n+
cv
cu(1  )

> 0
Since the trace and the determinants involved are polynomials of fq (and there-
fore continuous functions of fq), there exists a range of fq in the neighborhood
of zero, where the Routh-Hurwitz condition for local stability will be satised.
In other words, a su¢ ciently small value of fq ensures the local stability of the
system (53)-(55)
Appendix B: Derivation of general stability con-
ditions
Case 1. B 2 S
Equation (37) can be rewritten:
X
i2SnB
 i
dTiK
db
+ B
 
r   d
TB
K
db
!
+
v
1  
=
X
i2SnB
(B   i)
dTiK
db
+ B
 
r   d
T
K
db
!
+
v
1   = 0 (60)
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Because d(Ti=K)db =
Yi
K
dtB
db for i 2 SnfBg, we haveX
i2SnB
(B   i)
dTiK
db
=
X
i2SnB
(B   i)
Yi
K
dtB
db
=
 
B  
P
i2SnB i
Yi
KP
i2SnB
Yi
K
! X
i2SnB
Yi
K
dtB
db
= (B   )
X
i2SnB
d(Ti=K)
db
(61)
Substituting (61) into (60) and solving for d(T=K)db , we obtain (40).
Case 2. B =2 S
From equation (37)-(39) with dtB=db = 0, we have:
 
X
i2S
i
dTiK
db
+ B(1  tB)r +
v
1   = 0 (62)
By assumption dtidb =
dtj
db for i; j in S: Using
dtS
db to denote this common
value, we have X
i2S
i
dTiK
db
=
X
i2S
i
Yi
K
dtS
db
(63)
Plugging (63) into (62) and solving for dtSdb ,
dtS
db
=
 X
i2S
i
Yi
K
! 1 
B(1  tB)r +
v
1  

(64)
Using (64), we can write
d(T=K)
db
=
X
i2S
d(Ti=K)
db
+
d(TB=K)
db
=
X
i2S
Yi
K
dtS
db
+ tBr
=
 P
i2S i
Yi
KP
i2S
Yi
K
! 1 
B(1  tB)r +
v
1  

+ tBr
=

B
~
(1  tB)r + v~(1  )

+ tBr
= r +
v
~(1  ) +
 
B   ~
~
!
(1  tB)r (65)
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Appendix C: Corporate taxes as the scal instru-
ment
In this scenario the corporate tax rate, tf , is adjusted to satisfy (29). Firms
budget constraint is given by
_m = (1    m)n  sf (1  tf )(u   rm) (66)
Thus, the tax rate on corporate income (tf ) a¤ects the dynamics of rm debt
m as well as that of public debt b. In addition, changes in tf have direct e¤ects
on household dividend income (1   sf )(1   tf )(u   rm), thereby a¤ecting
consumption demand. Not surprisingly, therefore, the use of the corporate
income tax rate as the tax instrument complicates the analysis.
A clearer picture can be obtained by focusing on the sum of private and
public debt, m+ b. Adding (66) to (4) and rearranging terms, we have:
_m+ _b = [n+ g] + (1  tp)[(1  sf )(1  tf )(u   rm) + r(m+ b)]
  tw(1  )u   [ n+ u]  n(m+ b) (67)
The change in the debt of the consolidated rm/public sector depends in their
primary spending n + g (the rst term on the right-hand side of (67)); the
payment of dividend and interest to the household sector net of property income
tax revenue (the second term);. taxes on wage income (the third term); and
new equity issues and corporate gross prots (the fourth term). The positive
growth of capital, nally, helps stabilize the total debt-capital ratio (the fth
term).
The adjustment of tf by the government is required to keep C=K constant
at u n g. An increase in the total debt ratio (m+ b) raises interest income
and wealth, which in turn stimulates consumption for a given tf . To keep C=K
constant, the tax rate on corporate income income must be raised to reduce
dividend income. We have
d(C=K)
d(m+ b)
= cp(1  tp)

d(Div=K)
d(m+ b)
+ r

+
cv
1   = 0: (68)
Thus,
d(Div=K)
d(m+ b)
=  

r +
cv
cp(1  tp)(1  )

<  r if cv > 0 (69)
The required reduction in dividend income will more than o¤set the increase in
interest income as long as there is a positive wealth e¤ect (cv > 0); this stabilizes
the dynamics of the total debt ratio in (67). The stability of total debt m+b; in
turn, ensures the convergence of dividend income, (1  sf )(1  tf )(u  rm),
and retained earnings sf (1  tf )(u   rm); this result follows from equation
(29) which implies that (1  tf )(u   rm) is uniquely determined by m+ b.
From these observations, nally, it follows (using (18)) that rmsdebt-capital
ratio m must converge; the public debt ratio therefore also converges.
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The stationary solutions form and b are complicated functions of the various
parameters. The complications, however, do not invalidate the general point
about the role of public debt: in order to maintain a full-employment steady
growth path, the adjustment in public debt must keep total household wealth
at a desired level. Using (66) and (67), the sum of the stationary values 
householdstotal safe assets is given by
b +m =

1 cp
cp

(u   n  g) 

cw cp
cp

(1  tw)(1  )u    n
n+ cvcp(1 )
(70)
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